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FallaciesCognitive bias is an umbrella term used to explain subjective
perceptions of people, objects and/or events that deviate from a
normative framework [1]. Biases are normally created through an
interaction of heuristics (cognitive short-cuts [2]; with world ex-
periences [3]. Assessing the prevalence, impact and type of cogni-
tive bias on decision making in different parts of the justice system
should be prioritised to ensure continued trust in the system [4].
1. Juror decision making and their perceptions of forensic
evidence
Due to the weight of responsibility placed on jurors, any factors
which impact their decisions are, understandably, of particular
interest. For example, our understanding of the impact of racial
biases [5], rape myths [6], and gender biases relating to defendants,
victims and expert witnesses [7,8] on jurors have been markedly
improved by a wealth of rigorous and experimentally valid
research. More recently, Curley and colleagues have studied the* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Lee.Curley@open.ac.uk (L.J. Curley).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2020.01.004
2589-871X/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
0/).processes through which jurors form their judgements and make
their ﬁnal verdict [4,9]. Forensic psychology, legal research and now
decision science research are making joint headway in under-
standing the impact of biases on the decisionsmade at each stage of
the legal process.
Jurors place different weight on different types of evidence
presented to them. Forensic evidence (evidence obtained using
scientiﬁc methods such as ﬁngerprints, blood splatter, bite mark or
DNA analysis) is typically weighted strongly by juries [10]. Lynch
[10] suggests that DNA evidence is presently viewed as the current
‘gold standard’ in relation to the evidence presented in court. Bri-
ody [11] determined that the likelihood of a conviction after DNA
evidence was presented to a jury was much higher than without
DNA evidence. The convicted criminals themselves put a strong
emphasis on DNA evidence when considering the dangers of
committing a crime. Prainsack and Kitzberger [12] interviewed
criminals to determine their views on DNA and other forensic ev-
idence. These criminals believed that it was impossible not to leave
a DNA ﬁngerprint at a crime scene, and that DNA evidence is both
impenetrable and intimidating due to the scientiﬁc rigour applied
by an expert when interpreting the evidence. Furthermore, evi-
dence provided by a forensic science laboratory, despite being cir-
cumstantial, is seen as strong, important and inﬂuential by legal
laypersons when making decisions.
A recent review by Eldridge [13] discusses some of the difﬁ-
culties in presenting forensic evidence by an expert to a layperson
jury. For example, the review highlighted that jurors see the term
“match” as indicating a strong association between the suspect and
the forensic evidence left at a crime scene, whereas forensic ex-
aminers perceive the term match as a weaker association than
terms like “individualisation” and “identiﬁcation”. Eldridge [13]
also argues that jurors may prefer numerical testimony butmay not
fully understand said testimony; visual aids that help jurors un-
derstand probability may help here. Further, communication errors
may not be conﬁned to juries and the adversarial system, as Canela
et al. [14] found that legal experts, in the inquisitorial system, self-
reported that they had a relatively poor understanding of medical
evidence, and that there was no consensus on how legal experts
should evaluate medical and forensic reports. Furthermore, legale under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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struggle with scientiﬁc and mathematical terms, making it difﬁcult
for expert witnesses to communicate their evidence effectively to
said individuals. To mirror the point of Eldridge [13], future
research (particularly from cognitive psychologists and decision
scientists) is needed to further understand how jurors process
forensic evidence, and how their comprehension can be aided.
2. Previous research on cognitive bias in forensic science
The United Kingdom Home Ofﬁce, Association of Police and
Crime Commissioners, National Police Chief’s Council and the
House of Lords all agree that the fair administration of justice relies
upon public trust in the criminal justice system [15,16]. This public
trust depends on proper interpretation of forensic evidence by
examiners, and how said information is communicated to jurors
[17]. Therefore, to ensure that the public has trust in the legal
system, research from decision scientists is needed to ensure how
forensic scientists and other legal actors (such as police and jurors)
are making decisions.
Dror and Colleagues took pioneering steps in the ﬁeld of forensic
science to identify and highlight the stability of the effects of bias
across different forensic domains [17,18]. Their research highlights
that task-irrelevant contextual information can inﬂuence (or bias)
the judgments of forensic scientists when they are presented with
ambiguous information [17,18]. Bias produced from task-irrelevant
contextual information in forensic scientists (aptly named contex-
tual bias) may therefore impede the legal systems ability to deliver
justice in society.
Dror [19] also discussed ‘bias cascades’ and a ‘bias snowball’,
where bias from one piece of an investigation can accumulate,
potentially increasing the strength of the bias as each element of an
investigation interacts. Real-life cases (e.g. Madrid bombing) have
indicated that bias in forensic decision making may not be conﬁned
to the researcher’s lab and may lead to miscarriages of justice. Once
again highlighting the importance that can be placed on in-
vestigations into contextual bias and the potential effects that it can
have on the decision making of forensic scientists.
3. An inconvenient truth: more rigorous and ecologically
valid research is needed
Bias, from a layperson’s perspective, is a word synonymous with
error. The concept of anyone involved in the criminal justice system
making biased judgements e especially forensic scientistse is an
anathema. In the papers discussed above, it is assumed that cogni-
tive biases in forensic decision making reduce the accuracy of the
decisions. Indeed, very few studies have gone as far as to show,
through basic principles utilised in social science research (such as:
1) experimentally rigorous and ecologically valid methodologies;
and, 2) generalisable samples), that bias is associated with a
decrease in accuracy. There is every possibility then that cognitive
biases may actually improve accuracy in certain decision scenarios
(see Refs. [20,21,22]. For instance, Stevenage and Bennett [23] found
that task-irrelevant contextual information (DNA match, DNA un-
clear, DNA does not match) inﬂuenced (or biased) the decisions of
students when analysing ﬁngerprint evidence in both positive and
negative ways. Further, the knowledge of a DNA match increased
accuracy when the ﬁngerprints being analysed were a match, but
decreased accuracyonnon-matching trials. Theseﬁndings highlight
that the current discussion surrounding task-irrelevant contextual
informationandbias in forensic science is currently beingconducted
in a reductionistmanner, bias is a complex phenomenon and should
be treated, and studied, in such away. In summary, the relationship
that bias has with accuracy in forensic science is difﬁcult to assessbecause of themethodological limitations inmost studies and a lack
of external validation of cognitive biases (e.g., biases not being
studied in ecologically valid settings).
Cooper and Meterko [24] provide a recent systematic review
which outlines the susceptibility of forensic scientists to ‘conﬁr-
mation bias’. In their review, they highlight that many studies that
investigated cognitive bias used small samples and/or non-
practitioners (e.g., students of various abilities). Of the 21 studies
they reviewed that used practitioners, 13 had a sample size of less
than 25 practitioners. The participant number mean of 36.85
(across all the studies in the systematic review) was mainly due to a
single experiment with a large sample of 192 practitioners [25,26].
None of the 29 reviewed studies provided information about ran-
domisation of trials.
In addition, many of the reviewed studies did not address dif-
ferences between experimental and control groups, and this may
have confounded results. For example, Kukucka and Kassin [27] do
not report the age, gender and/or any other demographic infor-
mation about their participants; except that they were under-
graduate students in psychology. This failure to report demographic
materials makes it difﬁcult for researchers to generalise the results
of their studies. Cooper and Meterko [24] also identiﬁed that pre-
vious researchers consistently failed to blind participants to the
purposes of their research.
Further, several results sections did not include basic statistical
information such as effect size, measures of variability and/or an
inferential test statistic; some, worryingly, even conducted inap-
propriate statistical tests [24]. Finally, most of the previous research
on bias in forensic scientists has failed to generalise to the real-
world working practices of forensic scientists, and has therefore
been unsuccessful in demonstrating how bias inﬂuences the
operational accuracy of forensic scientists [28].While an increase in
interest in the impact of bias on forensic decision making is
welcome, more experimental rigour and ecological validity is
required to draw generalisable conclusions.
4. A collaboration between decision science and forensic
science is needed
Decision scientists (experts in decision making from disciplines
such as cognitive psychology, mathematics, philosophy and/or
economics; [29]) have developed methodological tools to conduct
research that can provide valid answers to questions regarding
cognitive bias in forensic decision making. Decision scientists have
the expertise to conduct carefully controlled experimental studies
that make use of well-established theoretical foundations in their
ﬁeld. For example, decision scientists have identiﬁed various types
of biases and fallacies, which allow decision scientists to investigate
the inﬂuence that biases may, or may not, have on forensic de-
cisions in a more nuanced manner. They can also rely on results
from different research programmes (e.g. bounded rationality;
heuristics and biases, normative theories), and are well versed in
sampling, experimental design and statistical analyses.
In summary, all of the factors mentioned above, would allow
decision scientists to test more rigorously the accuracy of forensic
decisions when task-irrelevant contextual information is taken into
account. They have already effectively investigated decisionmaking
in other disciplines such as medicine, law and ﬁnance [2,30,31].
However, where decision scientists need guidance from forensic
scientists is on the selection of stimulus material, contextual (both
task-relevant and -irrelevant) information and experimental ma-
nipulations [32]. Together, decision scientists and forensic scien-
tists can provide ecologically valid scientiﬁc data that can reveal the
true impact of task-irrelevant contextual information on forensic
decision making.
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